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This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal
for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is
constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy
of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive
identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new
form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world
of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and
the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive
relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the
individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This
paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is
neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on
Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the
self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is
a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction
and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the
social self, becomes its mediator.
Keywords: enactive self, social self, embodied self, body-social problem, distinction and participation
INTRODUCTION
Models and conceptions of the self are diverse. It is considered a
substance or a thing, a concept, a narrative, a system, a process
or a function; some even argue that there is no such thing as
the self (Hume, 1739; James, 1890; Dennett, 1992; Hayward, 1998;
Tani, 1998; Perlis, 1999; Strawson, 1999; Dainton, 2004;Metzinger,
2004; Zahavi, 2008). This list is not exhaustive but itmakes a point:
there is no unifying concept of the self.
The lack of a coherent concept of self is notmerely a philosoph-
ical armchair problem but remains an issue of general theoretical,
as well as practical, concern. Here lies the main motivation for
the present paper: to propose avenues for a philosophy of self that
eventually aids in facilitating dialog and research on the self across
the disciplines in cognitive science.
One desideratum for a cross-disciplinary approach to the self is
that it acknowledges the diversity of phenomena associated with
self and does not make an essentialist claim according to which
the self is, for example, either neurological or phenomenal while
other aspects are seen as irrelevant or added on. Shaun Gallagher
has recently warned against such reductionism of understanding
the self as essentially this or that“and nothingmore.”Alternatively,
Gallagher proposes a pluralistic, so-called “pattern theory of self:”
[W]hat we call a “self” is a cluster concept which includes a sufficient
number of characteristic features. Taken together, a certain pattern of
characteristic features constitute an individual self. (. . .) I propose that
we think of these aspects as organized in certain patterns, and that a
particular variation of such a pattern constitutes what we call a self.
(Gallagher, 2013, p. 2)
Examples of aspects that could serve as constituents of
a self-constitutive pattern are minimal embodied, minimal
experiential, affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, nar-
rative, extended, and situated. According to Gallagher, adopting a
pattern view of self helps understanding different aspects of the
self non-reductively “as compatible or commensurable instead of
thinking them in opposition.” He illustrates this for a particu-
lar conceptual tension in cognitive science, namely the question
whether self-hood is best explained in terms of cortical midline
structures, a particular brain region (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004) orwhether the necessary condition of self-hood is not rather
that all experiences acquire a first-personperspective (Légrand and
Ruby, 2009). On Gallagher’s pattern approach, resolving this con-
ceptual tension is now pretty simple: do not reside with either
of the positions but allow for the 1st person perspective or par-
ticular neuronal activation patterns to each count as one “among
other aspects” (Gallagher, 2013) of an organized pattern of self –
which in the present case, is a pattern defined in terms of minimal
embodied and experiential aspects.
I agree with Gallagher’s pledge for pluralism, but I also think
that his radical openness might prove somewhat too laissez-faire:
what makes any of the listed features part of a (meta-)theory of
self and what is it that makes a pattern of self acquire its particu-
lar organization? Once the diversity of self related phenomena is
acknowledged, we also need to understand how the elements of a
collection of relevant self features interrelate.
A pattern approach to the self acknowledges diversity but lacks
integration, offering no account of the individual as explanatory
whole. This poses more than a philosophical armchair problem
because what researchers in cognitive science believe the self to
be impacts very practically the way they conduct research, from
the choice of methodology in setting up experiments and forming
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hypothesizes, to the interpretation of results. It affects how amedi-
cal doctor assesses a person’s state of consciousness and well-being
or how a psychologist conceives of pathologies of the self and thus
whether she choses to treat with pharmaceuticals, body therapy or
social and dialogical intervention.
Understanding the self should therefore not consist only in
composing lists of aspects according to standards of a given con-
textual convenience; we still need a notion of the self as a whole,
something that can count as a distinguishable unit of explanation
and eventually help to interrelate different aspects of the self. As
Olson had argued almost two decades ago:
Simply extending the list will only make matters worse. What we need
is not just an account of self that would command wider assent than
any of these, but one that would synthesize them and show them all to
reflect a part of some larger, common idea (Olson, 1998, p. 651).
What I suggest in this paper is that such a larger, common idea
exists and that we do not have to chose between either a pluralistic
and laissez-faire or an essentialist and reductive approach to the
self. A middle way, that acknowledges diversity, while also offering
an integrative perspective on the self as a whole could be found
in considering the self from the perspective of enactive cognitive
science.
The enactive approach holds that biological and mental phe-
nomena are continuous, which means that it characterizes the
identity of cognitive beings by similar principles and concepts as
the identity of living beings (Clark, 2001; Thompson and Varela,
2001; Di Paolo et al., 2010). It proposes the biologically based
concept of autonomy to capture cognitive identity in terms of
self-generated, self-determined precarious networks (Thompson,
2007; Di Paolo et al., 2010). The concept of autonomyhas a fruitful
link to the question of self since both are at heart about individua-
tion and concerned with understanding what makes something –
or, in the present case, somebody – a coherent unity. The enactive
perspective on identity is neither reductionist nor essentialist but
aims at a wide enough focus to accommodate the diverse aspects
of cognition, while still being concise enough that it can pro-
vide constraints to interrelate them. For that reason I utilize the
concept of autonomy to inspire a new perspective on theories
of self. In this enactive approach, I take the fact that human
life is genuinely social to be of crucial relevance. I argue that
humans live not only in a world of others that affect them and
that they relate to, but that qua being interactors in a social world,
they also co-constitute each other’s self. The human self is not
only saturated by the social, but is also entirely inconceivable
without it.
The paper involves two layers of novelty, first, it provides an
elaboration of the notion of autonomy and the higher levels of
the life-mind continuity axis, which moves from basic, senso-
rimotor cognition to psychological and socially mediated forms
of human (cognitive) individuation. Second, it promises to help
clarify current conceptual tension associated with the bodily and
social dimension of self: while embodied cognitive science has
recognized for a while that humans are not their brains but rather
embodied and situated social beings, the field still faces another
dichotomy, namely the split between individual selves and the
social world of others. The social still plays the role of an out-
side and divided context: the external, independently given world
into which these newly embodied, yet essentially isolated selves
parachute1.
The following elaborations of the enactive concept of auton-
omy are thus at the same time concerned with what I call (in
reminiscence of the body-mind problem or as a successor to the
body-body problem) the body-social problem, i.e., the question
for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social
aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self as
a whole (Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2013)2.
The strategy for this paper is as follows: I begin by laying
out the body-social problem. This is followed by an introduc-
tion to the enactive approach to cognition, focusing particularly
on the notion of autonomy. In the next section I show that a
version of the body-social problem also applies to recent work
in enactive approaches to social cognition, in particular to par-
ticipatory sense-making. Coming back to the logic of some early
enactive philosophy by Hans Jonas, I then elaborate the notion of
autonomy in terms of sociality and outline an enactive approach
to the self that acknowledges diversity without being essentialist
and reductive. Support for this proposal is provided consider-
ing empirical evidence from research on social pain, quality of life
reports in global paralysis, as well as some examples from everyday
life.
THE BODY-SOCIAL PROBLEM IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE
There is a conceptual problem arising for recent philosophy of
cognitive science. It has to do with two important advances in the
development of cognitive science andhow they relate to the human
self- firstly, the realization that cognition is not brain-bound, but
embodied (the “embodied turn”) and secondly, the increasing
awareness that cognition is not individualistic, but also social (the
“social,” or if you will, “interactive turn,” De Jaegher et al., 2010).
Each of these developments itself constitutes an answer to a previ-
ously noted conceptual dichotomy: the embodied turn concerned
the dichotomy between brain and body, and the social turn, the
gap between individual and others.
Let me explicate this tension beginning with the first insight
that cognition is not in the head. Recent embodied and situated
cognitive science seeks to overcome the brain-bound view of cog-
nition and thereby the clear-cut separation between the individual
cognitive system and the environment as an objective and inde-
pendent given. Cognition is now considered a dynamic interplay
of individual bodily and environmental processes, with the brain
as a mediator of that interplay (Fuchs, 2011). In this view, cog-
nition also entails subjectivity so that research on cognition is no
longer restricted to third-person operational descriptions but also
relies on subjective and phenomenological observations from a 1st
and 2nd person perspective (Varela et al., 1993; Lutz, 2002; Lutz
and Thompson, 2003; Petitmengin, 2006).
1I borrow this image fromVarela et al. (1993) who used it not in a social sense but in
support of the idea that the organism and its environment co-determine each other.
The authors caricatured the cognitivist view as implying that the environment is
a “landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world” (p.
198).
2The body-body problem is the question how a living body can bring about embod-
ied experience (Hanna and Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 2007, pp. 235–237).
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The embodied view in cognitive science has implications for
understanding the self.While there are still some peoplewho argue
that self is found in the brain (e.g., Feinberg and Keenan, 2005;
Churchland, 2013), there now is a much wider range of research
on the embodied self that explores the role of more than neuronal
bodily structures and action for human identity (Gallagher, 2000;
Fuchs et al., 2010). It is investigated as a subjective and experi-
ential bodily self (Zahavi, 2008). There are new investigations on
the foundations of self and self consciousness in terms of bod-
ily processes, i.e., sensorimotor structures (Légrand, 2006; Gallese,
2014). The idea that the self is embodied has thus found increasing
acceptance.
As a consequence, we see new proposals for understanding dis-
orders of the self (such as autism, schizophrenia, etc.) not simply
as neurological dysfunctions, but rather as disturbances of senso-
rimotor capacities of this bodily subjectivity. Accordingly, there
are also suggestions for new forms of body based treatment and
therapy (Fuchs, 2005; Drayson, 2009; Röhricht, 2009; Parnass and
Sass, 2010). Perhaps here it is most evident why cognitive scientists
cannot merely adopt a pattern approach to the self, as Gallagher
suggested. Explaining schizophrenia as a disorder of the embodied
self, for example, cannot imply that the ordered self is considered to
be a lose collection of neuronal, social and also bodily aspects. The
way we reason for example about what goes wrong in a disorder
of the self reveals that instead we already have implicit assump-
tions about what counts as the ordered self as a whole, a coherent
explanatory unit – the body, in the present case.
While these considerations are not exhaustive, it thus seems fair
to say that cognitive science is on a good track to move from the
brain-bound to the embodied view of the self, where embodiment
amounts to more than a conceptual add-on.
Consider now the second development in cognitive science:
the growing acknowledgment of the idea that cognition involves
the social and is, broadly construed, also concerned with inter-
subjectivity and with understanding others. This has become a
subject of interest across the disciplines in cognitive science. The
relevance of social interaction is, for instance, argued for in psy-
chological studies on child development, particularly in neo-natal
imitation and early infant–mother relations (see e.g., Trevarthen
and Aitken, 2001; Reddy, 2003; Rochat et al., 2009). The interper-
sonal approach has attracted increasing interest in neuroscience,
in particular with regards to the question of understanding oth-
ers, e.g., in research on the (in)famous mirror neurons (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998; Gallese, 2013), and in simulation theory
approaches (Frith and Frith, 2010; Gallotti and Frith, 2013). In
more philosophical approaches we find the corresponding objec-
tions to brain-based accounts of social cognition (e.g., Gallagher,
2001) and developments emphasizing the social dimension of self
in terms of narrative practices (Hutto, 2010, 2014). There have
also been more general considerations about the relation between
low-level embodied and social forms of cognition (De Jaegher and
Froese, 2009) and newbasic concepts that capture the essential role
of intersubjectivity in structuring human cognition (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007). In addition, we observe a flowering dialog
between cognitive science and phenomenology of intersubjectivity
reconsidering authors such as Husserl,Merleau-Ponty, Gurwitsch,
or Schütz (e.g., Thompson et al., 2005; Zahavi, 2008).
The question is, how do these two developments, the embod-
ied and social, go together; or better, how do the bodily and social
dimensions figure in the individuation of the human self? From a
pattern theory approach to the self à la Gallagher they seem com-
patible and could complete existing theories of the self, adding
novel (e.g., sensorimotor and sociocultural) items to a list of (pre-
viously neuronal) aspects associated with the self. This perspective
is mainly descriptive, which is why it also risks not adding much
to understanding the self from a philosophical point of view. As
already pointed out in the introduction, one of the reasons why it
matters thatwe do adoptmore than amere completion perspective
is that (interdisciplinary) research cannot do with a lose collection
of aspects, but must refer to a coherent unity, with which partic-
ular aspects, such as neuronal, bodily or social are then possibly
associated.
I therefore suggest considering that embodied and social
approaches to cognition entail the attempt to re-determine the
boundaries of the individual. From this perspective, the embodied
and social turns would therefore entail claims about what counts
as the individual (agent, system, person, self) as a whole, each
specifying an individuating principle or the essential or minimal
sense of this whole.
However, upon accepting that embodied and social cognitive
sciencemakes implicit assumptions about what counts as the indi-
vidual in this sense, we will see that these developments are, as it
were, in tension. The self as a whole can either be embodied or
social, but it cannot be both.
Cognitive scientistsmight give one of the following two answers
in response to this. According to the first, they might assume that
the body is equated with the self. When speaking of the indi-
vidual, then clearly no longer referring to the brain, they mean
the lived and living body as a whole. According to this, there
is an embodied core self, which is equated with the individual
embodied or living organism (Parnass and Sass, 2010, p. 230).
Other recent approaches associated with the idea of such an
embodied core self are, for example, Albahari’s (2007) concept
of perspectival ownership, Damasio’s (2006) core consciousness and
Zahavi’s (2008) minimal self, which considers self from a phe-
nomenological viewpoint of bodily subjectivity. It is assumed
that such a bodily, minimal self is present from birth (Krueger,
2011).
Even though proponents of this answer (the self is equal to
the body) would probably agree that embodied and social aspects
of self are closely interrelated, there seems to be a strong intu-
ition that something about the self remains entirely independent
from the question of sociality (Zahavi, 2008, 2010) and that this
something – a core self, if you will – can be associated with the
body as an organic, separate and individual entity. The social in
this version is of course not irrelevant, yet because it provides
the context in which the minimal bodily self is embedded, it
figures non-constitutively in the individuation of self3. In other
words, there can be a self as a whole without the social. I call this
claim about the interrelation of body, social and self the social as
contextual claim.
3I rely on a recent distinction made by De Jaegher et al. (2010) between contextual,
enabling, and constitutive roles of the social for cognition.
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The other way to answer the question of how social and bod-
ily dimensions relate with regards to the individuation of self as
distinguishable unity is to assume that the social, instead of the
body, is the primary source of individuation. One might call this
the social as constitutive claim. It states that the core self relies on
social processes and that it could not be a self without them. On
this account, in its most minimal sense, the self is not neuronal or
bodily, but must be essentially a social self.
There are not many researchers in cognitive science who would
currently adopt this position decisively, a notable exception being
De Haan (2010) who criticized the notion of aminimal bodily self
and claimed quite specifically that the self, in its minimal sense, is
a social self. The idea of self as social is of course not new; it can
be traced back to the work of researchers such as Mead (1934),
Buber (1947/2002), Vygotsky (1986). Hermans et al. (1992) sug-
gested over a decade ago that the self is social and dialogical in
the sense that “other people occupy positions in the multivoiced
self”. However, it is not clear whether these approaches make an
essentialist/constitutive or a contextual claim about the role of the
social for the self. In order to argue for a constitutive role of the
social in the individuation of the self as a whole no stronger state-
ment about the status of the bodymight be required as it leaves the
possibility open that the relevant processes of self individuation
could be mediated in terms of mere brain activity, thus trivial-
izing the role sensorimotor structures and other non-neuronal
bodily structures. Hermans and Gieser (2012), for instance, locate
the biological basis of the dialogical self in the orbitofrontal cor-
tex and the subcortical limbic system, thus leaving the relation
between self as bodily and self as social underspecified (Cresswell
and Baerveldt, 2011). An emphasis on the role of the social in the
constitution of the self as a whole might therefore risk to down-
play the other achievement in cognitive science, the embodied
turn.
It is possible to make a stronger statement about the role of the
body for an essentially social self. But for a claim that the body
plays a non-trivial role in the social constitution of the self as a
whole to make sense a clarification is required on what counts as
a body. That is because embodiment, commonly understood, still
equates with organismic embodiment as well as with movement
(for a discussion see Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2013), and there is
nothing social about the organismic or the moving body per se.
Nevertheless, whether or not the essentially social self is seen as
neurally or bodily mediated, it would still be in tension with the
contextual social contribution claim according to which the body
is the primary source of individuation.
This is the prevalent tension in cognitive science with regards
to the individuation of self. In reminiscence of the body-mind
problem or as a successor to the body-body problem I will call
it the body-social problem, i.e., the question for philosophy of
cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in
the individuation of the human individual self (Kyselo and Di
Paolo, 2013). This tension exists for any approach in cognitive sci-
ence making a claim about the self as a whole or coherent unity,
thus implying a more-than-pluralistic notion of the self. Propo-
nents of an embodied view of individuation risk giving lip service
to the social while those emphasizing the role of the social risk
doing the same with respect to the body. Both approaches are
mutually exclusive. Without due conceptual clarification, adopt-
ing either version, i.e., a primacy of embodiment or a primacy
of the social, reduces the other. The assumption that the body
individuates the self while the social remains merely context
puts into doubt the second disciplinary development in cogni-
tive science, the social turn, and would reinvite accusations of
methodological individualism. One could argue that while now
there no longer exists a dichotomy between the brain as indi-
vidual and the world of others, there still exist a dichotomy
between the body-as-individual and the world of others. Yet it
remains unclear how to work an embodied perspective into an
account that takes seriously the role of the social in individua-
tion, when the relevant contribution could equally be made by the
brain.
To see that this body-social problem is not an abstract the-
oretical issue, consider two empirical examples: social pain and
locked-in syndrome. Firstly, Eisenberger (2011)has shown that the
experience of social rejection (in her example, being excluded from
participating in a game) leads to the same activation of neuronal
circuitry as physical pain (in reaction to increased temperature).
This arguably suggests that people who are socially rejected expe-
rience this as similar distressing as bodily pain. Eisenberger argues
that this has evolutionary reasons. Humans rely on “social con-
nection” in order to ensure their survival. Social rejection hurts so
we avoid (life) threatening situations in which we find ourselves
separated from others. Here it seems that the body constitutes
the core of human existence as a biological whole. Through pain
signals it ensures its integrity, while the social is a means to the
same end.
Secondly, consider locked-in syndrome, a case of global paral-
ysis, which leaves a person’s entire body paralyzed (with the
exception of minimal eye movement, such as blinking), yet her
consciousness preserved. The patient’s bodily capacities are dras-
tically restricted. Yet inquiries about the quality of life in patients
with locked-in syndrome reveal that their self-reported well-being
does not differ significantly from that of “normal” subjects. These
studies show that the patients’well-being is not equatedwith phys-
iological capacities. What mattered is that that they were able to
engage with others, be recognized and experience themselves as
subjects. Locked-in syndrome was not considered a physiological
but rather social condition (Gosseries et al., 2009; Lulé et al., 2009).
These findings seem counter-intuitive for an embodied approach
to the self. If the self was equated with the body and the bodily self
is what grounds first-person subjectivity then the patients’ well-
being should be worse, since locked-in syndrome affects the body
as a whole.
How we interpret these empirical examples will in each case
depend on which version of body-social relation to the self we
adopt. Should we explain bodily experiences (such as social pain)
and self experience (positive quality of life in LIS) using a theory
of the self seated in bodily or organic processes or do these cases
rather show that human nature and thus the self is genuinely
social and that the body plays an important, but rather enabling
role?
One option to avoid a pluralistic or pattern approach to the
self (in which body and social co-exist as different aspects of the
self) and to still provide an alternative for a cross-disciplinary
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approach to the self, is to adopt an essentialist perspective, accord-
ing to which the self as a whole is either embodied or social.
But this option risks privileging one dimension, while reducing
the other to a contextual element. Either view remains problem-
atic for the purposes of cognitive science. A pattern approach
acknowledges diversity without integrating, while an essentialist
view offers a sense of unity but at the risk of being reductive and
of trivializing the role of either the social or embodied turn in
cognitive science. Does this mean we have to decide that one of
the two is less relevant or are merely dimensions of a lose pattern
of self?
I do not think so. There is a way to argue for amore than plural-
istic perspective that does not require one to assume an essentialist
perspective on the self as being either embodied or social. I propose
that the body-social problem can be resolved by adopting an enac-
tive approach to the self. However, this point requires nuance and
elaboration, since I think there is a version of enactivism that does
address the role of bodily and social processes in the emergence of
individual autonomy – namely, participatory sense-making – yet
still gets us into the same trouble with the body-social problem.
THE ENACTIVE APPROACH TO COGNITION
A central proposal of the enactive approach is that there is a con-
tinuity of mind and life, i.e., that mental phenomena can be
understood based on the principles that describe the organiza-
tion and behavior of all life, including the simplest life form such
as the single cell organism (Varela, 1997; Thompson, 2007). The
philosopher of biology Hans Jonas provided some of the basic
definitions of living and cognitive identity. They have been taken
up by more recent research in the enactive tradition. The most
important idea with respect to the present paper concerns how
Jonas conceived of the relation between the individual organism
and the world. According to Jonas, the boundary, i.e., that which
allows us to identify the individual organism as individual is an
emerging distinction. He says:
Sameness, while it lasts . . . is perpetual self-renewal through process,
borne on the shift of otherness. This active self-integration of life alone
gives substance to the term “individual” . . . its very existence at any
moment, its duration and its identity in duration is, then essentially
its own function, its own concern, its own continuous achievement
(Jonas, 1966/2001, p. 80).
Crucial to Jonas’ idea is that the processes involved in the emer-
gence of the organism are in principle not different than those
of the organism’s environment. These organic processes have a
“double nature:”
the materials are essential to [the organism] specifically, accidental
individually; it [the organism] coincides with their actual collection at
the instant, but is not bound to any one collection in the succession
of instants ... “[d]ependent on their availability as material, it [the
organism] is independent of their sameness as these; its own, functional
identity, passingly incorporating theirs, is of a different order (ibid.).
This means that the individual organism creates its identity as
an organism by negotiating a permanent tension between a need
for material resources from the world that “it is made of” and
the simultaneous drive to emancipate or free itself from some of
the material processes, so it can exist as an independent individ-
ual. The organism’s identity thus relies on organic matter that
serves as “constructive material” on one side, and yet at the same
time provides identity by being organized in a particular func-
tional way (“a different order”). A fundamental tension exists
at the heart of organic life, between a general dependence on
material resources and a striving for emancipation from them.
Jonas called this tension “needful freedom” (Jonas, 1966/2001,
p. 80).
Needful freedom means that an organism’s identity is onto-
logically relational and interactively constructed. Jonas sees the
organism as a precarious being, remaining restless as long as it is
alive. As Thompson has put it, the “organism has to change; sta-
sis is impossible” (Thompson, 2007, p. 152). It is concerned with
its own survival and with having to avoid conditions that lead to
disintegration, i.e., its death. The organism is thus permanently
in need because in order to survive it has to continuously interact
with the environment. One can say that the organism is therefore
relatively, but never fully, “in control” of the construction of its
very identity.
Over the last decades Jonas’ ideas have been elaborated and
more formally expressed in various ways, which together ground
an enactive view of cognitive individuation (e.g., Maturana and
Varela, 1980; Varela et al., 1993; Varela, 1997; Weber and Varela,
2002; Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo and Thomp-
son, 2014). The basis for this view is the notion of autopoiesis,
according to which living beings are defined as self-organized
autonomous networks that produce and sustain themselves as a
systemic whole – an identity within a particular domain (Varela,
1997; Maturana and Varela, 1980, 1987). The production and
maintenance of such an identity requires that some relations
between the processes of the network remain constant despite
structural dependence on the environment. This characteristic
of identity has been referred to as operational closure (Maturana
and Varela, 1987; Di Paolo et al., 2010). More recently these ideas
have been elaborated in order to understand not only biolog-
ical but also cognitive individuation. Some enactivists propose
that cognitive systems are best conceived as autonomous systems.
According to this idea, a cognitive system’s identity is a network
of processes that self-produces and maintains the network as an
interconnected network, i.e., each process in the network is not
only enabling but also enabled by some other process. The iden-
tity is sustained under“precarious conditions,” sincewithout being
organized in an interconnected way the individual processes mak-
ing up the network would risk running down and the network
as a whole could dissipate (Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008). In line
with Jonas, from the enactive perspective cognitive beings are thus
considered intrinsically purposeful beings: they strive to maintain
life, which is considered a natural property (Weber and Varela,
2002).
Based on this concern for survival, cognitive beings develop a
perspective on the world, from which environmental features and
interactions are evaluated and acquire a meaning and a normative
status. Not every aspect of the world matters. The normative sta-
tus of environmental aspects and interactions depends onwhether
they count as threatening or beneficial to the basic goal of identity
maintenance (Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson and Stapleton, 2009).
Here lies, according to more recent proponents of the enactive
approach, the difference between a mere living system and a
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living cognitive system. A cognitive system’s perspective on the
world depends not only directly on its physical survival – the
“mother-value of all values” (Weber and Varela, 2002, p. 111) –
but enlarges its action possibilities, from immediate reactions to
existential perils, to a recognition of more fine-grained ways to
maintain its existence. A cognitive system evaluates its interac-
tions adaptively, thus flexibly regulating and changing its own
conditions of identity maintenance (Di Paolo, 2005). Cogni-
tive individuation in the autonomous self-production of identity
entails a view of cognition as goal-directed, value-driven and pur-
poseful. Cognitive systems have a basic intrinsic twofold goal:
to create and maintain an identity and to generate sense or
meaning.
For that reason cognitive identity of the autonomous system
cannot only be grasped from a third-person, operational defi-
nition of the processes involved in its individuation; instead, it
requires a view from which the world is encountered and inter-
actions are evaluated by the system itself. The enactive approach
thus adopts a complementary perspective on cognition, one which
also considers the perspective of the cognitive system itself. On
this view, research on cognition also relies on subjective and
phenomenological observations from 1st and 2nd person perspec-
tives (Varela et al., 1993; Lutz, 2002; Lutz and Thompson, 2003;
Petitmengin, 2006). With regard to the question of the self, this
means taking the first-person perspective – and therefore subjec-
tive experiences and phenomenological investigation – seriously,
when it comes to describing its basic structures.
THE BODY-SOCIAL PROBLEM IN ENACTIVISM
Let me now consider how the aforementioned two shifts in con-
temporary cognitive science, the embodied and the social turn,
are accounted for in current work in the enactive tradition. In
the enactive approach, the body is what grounds a cognitive sys-
tem’s identity and individuates it as a living entity. It allows the
autonomous system to differentiate itself from the environment
(Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014) and it is also the means and
reason for the cognitive system’s engagement and evaluations of
its interactions with the world (Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2013). On
the one hand, the body is assumed to inform the cognitive sys-
tem how it is faring with regards to its own intrinsic goals –
for instance through emotions (Colombetti and Torrance, 2009;
Colombetti, 2014) – but it is due to being embodied that, on
the other hand, a cognitive system can have any goals at all. If
bodily existence were not finite, nothing would matter to a cogni-
tive system. The individuation of identity and sense-making – the
adaptive regulation of interaction with the world – can be realized
in various ways, including, for example, through the appropri-
ation of non-physiological tools (Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2013).
This is based on the life-mind continuity hypothesis, accord-
ing to which autonomous self-individuation is not limited to
biological processes but can be found at higher levels of cog-
nition, too. This brings us to the second shift in contemporary
cognitive science, the question of how, for researchers in the enac-
tive tradition, the social figures in the individuation of cognitive
identity.
That human life is not merely biological but also social has
been taken seriously by some proponents of the enactive approach
(Gallagher, 2001; Thompson, 2007; De Jaegher and Froese, 2009;
De Jaegher et al., 2010; Di Paolo et al., 2010). One central example
for this that I focus on now is “participatory sense-making” (De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Participatory sense-making reflects a
classical idea from sociology and system theory, that based on the
dynamical behaviors of (at least two) individual agents an inter-
action process emerges that exhibits new properties irreducible to
the individuals concerned, so that it can be described as a new sys-
temic entity (Luhmann, 1992). It uses the concept of autonomy to
characterize this new systemic entity as a social form of autonomy,
an “interactive autonomy.” Participatory sense-making elaborates
on the idea that identity is not passively given but brought forth
through interactions with the environment. But it is concerned
with a form of autonomy in the relational processes based on
coordinated social interactions of participants (De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, 2007; Colombetti and Torrance, 2009, p. 32).
Recent proponents in the enactive tradition acknowledge that
human cognition is not brain-bound, but a matter of embod-
ied, sensorimotor engagement with the environment, as well as
a matter of social interactions, as the example of participatory
sense-making shows.
But with regards to the present issue, the body-social prob-
lem, I show now that the enactive approach currently entails
an ambiguity about the role of social interactions for the indi-
viduation of identity. To explain this requires, as a first step, to
disentangle two senses, in which social interactions appear to be
relevant for proponents of participatory sense-making. Firstly,
in that social interactions matter with regards to a group of
(classically two) individuals, jointly creating the autonomy of
the interaction process. Here we look at an autonomous sys-
tem whose identity as a whole is defined in terms of human
social interactions. It is a group identity. Secondly, participa-
tory sense-making also says something about the role of social
interactions for the individual: they enlarge individual cognitive
capacities.
Participatory sense-making thus implies that there are individ-
uals involved in social interaction. But what can be said about their
nature as individual identities? This question remains implicit
within the theory. But let me point out some indications of what
could count as an answer to what the individual is for participa-
tory sense-making. There are at least two possible readings. One
option would be to say that social interactions matter not only for
augmenting the individual’s cognitive capacities but also for its
identity as such. This seems to be what De Jaegher and Di Paolo
(2007, p. 492) have inmindwhen they write that their“perspective
bypasses the circularity that arises from pre-conceiving individu-
als as ready-made interactors. Individuals co-emerge as interactors
with the interaction.” In this vein one might characterize the indi-
vidual identity as essentially a (socially) relational and interacting
being, in other words, as a participant.
This however, raises a worry. Critics might argue that an
identity that is defined as being relational or a participant in
social interactions runs the risk of dissolving in the interaction
process, effectively becoming invisible as an individual identity
(Hutto, 2010). But why should a focus on the interaction dynam-
ics imply that there is no individual contribution or that the
individual risks dissolving? One reason could be that as of now
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in participatory sense-making the individual’s nature as a rela-
tional being is underdetermined with respect to its own identity. It
appears that the intrinsic purpose of participatory sense-making
is not directed at the emergence and maintenance of the indi-
vidual’s identity but at that of an overall interaction dynamics,
in other words, at the group identity. From this perspective, the
individual participants of course make an important contribu-
tion. They act as constituents of a higher order dynamics, in
that they “sustain the encounter, and the encounter itself influ-
ences the agents and invests them with the role of interactors”
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 492). The problem is that
if being relational means being part of a process whose prop-
erties are irreducible to the individual (p. 494) and if, as De
Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 493) say “the regulation is aimed
at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent
autonomous organization,” then for the individual to be an indi-
vidual it would have to adapt to an external norm. This norm
has to do with the group’s identity and the interaction dynam-
ics of which the individual is part. If that were generally be the
case, then the individual would actually not be autonomous but
rather heteronomous, as it is not governed by its own laws of
self-organization. The individual would risk dissolving because
it merges with the social environment rather than emerging
from it.
Note thatDe Jaegher andDiPaolo (2007, p. 492) try to avoid the
worry that identity is lost in interaction dynamics. They empha-
size that “the autonomy of the individuals as interactors must
also not be broken . . . [o]therwise the individual (as the other)
would “become a tool, [or] an object.” They appear to defend
their view by saying that a person is individuated from others
qua being embodied. This is supported by quotations such as
the following: “When we speak about cognitive agents in inter-
action, the basis for such a coupling can take various shapes and
involve various perceptual systems, sensorimotor flows, neural,
and physiological processes, external objects, and technologi-
cal mediation.” Co-regulation involves “bodily variables, such as
relative positions and timing between movements, coordination
between perceptual systems, and neuro-physiological variables”
(ibid.). Such wording suggests that the individuals involved in
participatory sense-making are bodily beings. If the mentioned
processes and mechanisms of co-regulation ground the individ-
ual’s identity then itwould be an individual thatmoves, has a brain,
interacts with material environment, in short is a body. However,
it would also be, as it were, unsocial because nothing in the defini-
tion of the body as such is social. The identity of the individual is
then defined not in social terms, but remains bodily. Ironically, in
their very attempt to keep the individual from dissolving, partic-
ipatory sense-making therefore risks to downplay the role of the
social. The body, while differentiating the individual from oth-
ers, would be a locus of isolation, not a means of connection and
engagement.
Oneway for proponents of participatory sense-making to avoid
this second horn of the dilemma would be to admit that individu-
ation of human identity is not fully determined in terms of bodies
in isolation but requires that the body engages in socially mediated
interactions with the world. This would permit a view according
to which both claims come together: individuals are not merely
embodied, but they are also interactors. This may be the view
that proponents of participatory sense-making are actually argu-
ing for. However, this position would suffer from the first horn
of the dilemma of the body-social problem, for it implies that
the social matters only as a context, in which bodily individuals
relate to each other as otherwise ready-made identities. Participa-
tory sense-making risks trivializing the role of social interactions
as mere context, a position that stands in stark contrast to the
original claims of the theory.
When it comes to defining the individual, the enactive approach
currently thus gives an ambiguous answer to the body-social
problem.With regards to embodiment and the role of social inter-
actions for the self as a whole, it remains caught in a dilemma.
With its identity heteronomically defined as being a participant,
the individual either risks immersing and getting lost in the social
interaction, or the individual becomes isolated, with its iden-
tity defined in terms of bodily processes. Like other research in
embodied and social cognitive science that attemps to define the
individual as a whole, participatory sense-making actually runs
the risk of being individualistic, not in the sense that it implies a
split between an objective andmaterial world and the brain-bound
individual, but rather a split between a material and social world
and body-bound individuals.
To conclude, while participatory sense-making is essential for
understanding social cognition as a processual and interactive
phenomenon and will be important to understand some of the
underlying dynamics of group identity construction and inter-
relations of individuals, its concept of the individual remains
ambiguous. We have still to provide more steps within the con-
ceptual move from the low-level cellular to the higher, bodily and
social levels of autonomy.
Without further conceptual clarifications and a definition of
what counts as the individual, the concept of autonomy, which
is considered a crucial building block for the enactive approach
to human cognitive individuation, remains underspecified. If this
remains the case, critics of the enactive approachmight find it diffi-
cult to seehow thenotionof autonomycanhelp cognitive scientists
address important questions at the intersection of individual and
social cognition.
As we will see in the remainder of this paper, the notion of
individual autonomy canbe elaborated following the classical logic
of the enactive position itself. In the next two sections I outline
how one can account for the individual in cognition in a way
that avoids the body-social problem without being reductive or
essentialist. I propose an approach to the self that acknowledges
plurality while also offering an idea how it might form a coherent
unity.
AN ENACTIVE APPROACH TO THE SELF
In this section I outline an account for the individual self in
a way that avoids a tension between the role of bodily and
social processes in cognitive individuation. From an enactive
point of view, it is therefore crucial to carefully distinguish on
the one hand between two different kinds of identity that the
enactive approach refers to as autonomous system – the iden-
tity of a group (autonomy in the interaction process) and the
identity of the individual (individual autonomy). On the other
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hand, we also need to differentiate two kinds of organizational
principles – one in terms of bodily and organismic, and the
other, in terms of social interaction processes. What I focus on
here is how bodily and social processes matter for individual
autonomy.
We must also acknowledge that, while the individualism
entailed in an (essentially) embodied view of the self is reduc-
tive, it also has an important point: it introduces a distinction
between the individual and the world and thus makes it distin-
guishable as what it is: an individual, and not the world. As I argue
in the following, it is not the distinction between individual and
world per se that we should give up, but the degree to which a
brain- or body-bound view would force us to endorse it. Speak-
ing about separation from the environment (and thus about the
individual as an identifiable whole) does not rule out that social
interactions are vital for cognition (as participatory sense-making
has it) nor force us to assume that the individual is an isolated
being parachuted into the social world. The solution is to recon-
cile both views by finding a common ground fromwhich amiddle
way can emerge.
I propose that this common ground can be derived from the
logic of the individuation of organismic identity entailed in Hans
Jonas’ notion of “needful freedom.” The notion captures a prin-
ciple that I believe is most useful for beginning to conceptualize
the basic organization of the human self as a distinguishable unit
of explanation. This principle is what I will call the individua-
tion through and from a world: an individual identity reflects, in its
structure and existential needs and concerns, theworld fromwhich
it continuously emerges; but, in order to exist as an individual, it
thereby also emancipates itself from the world through those very
same processes.
This principle demands two things: first, that the processes
defining an identity are in principle of the same kind as those of
its environment and second, that there is not only interaction with
the world but also emancipation from it. The two together ground
the tension between needing the world (needful) and striving to
emancipate from it (freedom).
In line with the hypothesis of the life-mind continuity, I pro-
pose to use the principle of individuation through and from a
world to inspire a new look at the individual self, which can be
formalized in terms of the enactive notion of autonomy. The key
idea for this to temporarily free Jonas’ notion from the realm of
the bodily and organic and to wonder what it would mean for a
human social individual to be needful and free. The body-social
problem for participatory sense-making (and cognitive science
in general) arises when, while making the embodied and social
turn, one does not fully endorse the principle of through and
from a world. Freeing, I should thus emphasize, really means to
bracket for a moment any role that the body might play in the
individuation of human cognitive identity and to instead con-
sider human individuation as a social process rigorously and
all the way down (the body does play a non-trivial role but I
will get to this in the next section). This means to define the
human self organizationally as a whole in terms of social inter-
actions and exchanges with the environment. In this context
I refer to social interactions as virtual or actual interpersonal
engagements of at least two individuals, but also processes of
self-relating and being related in social relationships4. The types
of processes that individuate the self as identity are therefore rela-
tional in nature (Tschacher and Rössler, 1996). This realization
means that the self is never seen as given or as something that
an individual just has – it is an achievement, constantly open to
change and, at best, something between individuals. The self thus
never just is but rather emerges continuously and jointly relying
on behavior and action and on doing and being together with
others.
The next important step is to thereby take seriously that, while
the principle of individuation through and from a world entails the
individual’s emergence in dependence on the social world, it also
requires its emancipation from it.Without this second aspect, that
is without a distinction, the individual would dissolve in social
interactions, becoming invisible as individual. Again, to introduce
this distinction does not require a shift to an ontologically different
kind of identity, say the body (or brain). It can be achieved at the
same level. It simply means that the social processes involved in
individuationmatter in different ways: in providing the “material”
on which the individual’s identity constructively relies, but also in
forming its identity as that particular social individual standing
out against the social relations of which it is made. I believe Mead
captured the same idea in principle when he said, in Mind, Self
and Society, that the self is “an eddy in the social current and so
still a part of the current” (Mead, 1934, p. 182).
In this way we begin to expand Jonas’ concept of needful
freedom, from referring to biological individuation, to an indi-
viduation in terms of social interactions. However, to say that the
individual emerges through social interactions is not quite enough
to capture the idea of freedom and emancipation entailed in the
principle of through and from a world. Individuation must also
involve a particular flexibility and the possibility of ongoing emer-
gence, not just of a one-time instantaneous independence. We
have seen this in the case of the organism whose freedom is rel-
ative in the sense that it “coincides with their actual collection at
the instant, but is not bound to any one collection in the succes-
sion of instants” (Jonas, 1966/2001, p. 80). The organism is always
dependent on organicmatter but what allows it to be an individual
organism is that it is not always dependent on the same organic
matter.
I propose that just as the organism’s metabolism continu-
ously exerts a choice by taking in only particular processes, while
avoiding others, so too the socially organized individual can-
not incorporate all social interactions or relations at the same or
throughout time, but rather and at different instants in time only
particular collections of them. The basic idea is thus to transfer the
temporal dimension entailed in Jonas’ perspective on individua-
tion to the level of the human individual and to capture the tension
of through and from a world by admitting that, while individua-
tion always relies on social interactions and relations, these can
vary and matter for the individuation of self to different degrees.
In principle the individual does therefore not depend on any single
4My requirement for an interaction to count as social is therefore lower than typically
assumed in enactive social cognition. A social interaction need not involve equal
subjects. A relation between an infant and its care-giver, a prisoner and guard or
between an ego-centric and empathic person is social even when the recognition of
subjects as free and autonomous individuals might have different degrees.
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one of them. The construction of human identity occurs not in
terms of organismic, but rather social needful freedom.
Social needful freedom would do more justice to the role of
social interactions and relations than current models of the indi-
vidual in cognitive science allow: they do not merely matter in
that they constitute the individual’s identity as a participant in
an interaction or belonging to a group. It is also through social
interactions and relations that the individual can free itself and
enable itself to move away from some interactions and/or to
engage in certain others. Because at different instants in time the
individual can engage in certain or disengage from certain other
relations, it achieves a relative or functional degree of indepen-
dency, a mobility that is social. In this way the individual frees
and distinguishes itself through time, not merely through being a
moving separate body. Nevertheless, as long as it is an individual,
it cannot free itself fully from the social interactions and relations,
since they are the general “relational material” that it is made of
and only against and through which the individual could ever be
emancipated5.
Let me now indicate how the idea of social needful freedom
can be used for elaborating the enactive notion of autonomy as
introduced in section “The Enactive Approach to Cognition,” so
that it can inspire an approach to self that is integrating without
being reductive or essentialist. I would like to emphasize that I aim
to initiate the beginning steps toward re-thinking the concept of
autonomy to ground novel approaches to the self, not to provide
a full-fledged theory of the self.
The model is basic in the sense that it conceptualizes the self at
the most encompassing level required for understanding it as an
organized unity, while however abstracting over particular phe-
nomena of self, inter- and intra-individual variations, as well as
across development, disposition and enactment of self and the
particular cultural context, in which the self is embedded in.
Indications of how this abstraction can be used to illuminate the
different manifestations and dimensions of self will be given later.
Right now the goal is to help in avoiding the trap of thinking of
the self either as individualistic and embodied, or as social and
potentially lost in interaction.
The first step toward a definition of individual autonomy in
terms of social cognition is to begin thinking the individual as
arising from a sea of social relational, not merely bodily pro-
cesses. In this way the autonomous network is therefore not only
5The idea of social needful freedom might be in tension with some phenomeno-
logical accounts of intersubjectivity (e.g., Henry, 1988 or Husserl, 1992/1930). The
sense of self in our self-other relation involves a first-person givenness and therewith
a sense of separation from others and, at the same time, there is something about the
experience of the other that escapes my own experience. This seems to contradict
my idea that the individual can never free itself from the social as material of its own
self-constitution. I am afraid I cannot do justice to the rich body of phenomeno-
logical inquiries into self and understanding others in this paper. But generally
speaking I am convinced that the idea of social freedom is in principle compatible
with phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity. What it challenges are some
deep intuitions about the structure of first-person perspective and to which extent
experiences of ipseity and alterity are conclusive to it. The suggestion that, contra
Henry’s absolute immanence, it might be relationally co-enacted, is not to replace,
but rather to complement phenomenological inquiries. My hope is that the pro-
posed organizational perspective herein helps to specify just the how first-person
perspective is constituted. This could be seen as part of an ongoing dialog between
cognitive science and phenomenology of intersubjectivity.
a metabolically “self-generated identity” (Di Paolo et al., 2010)
but actually also, and necessarily, an identity that remains open
to structural change generated in interaction with others. It is a
self-other-generated network. This means that the organizational
process that constitutes the identity of the individual are defined
in terms of interpersonal behavior and action6. Let me now deter-
mine in a second step just how these processes are minimally
organized so that they bring about the individual as self-other
generated autonomous network.
Capturing the idea of social needful freedom in terms of indi-
vidual autonomy, the autonomous network that constitutes an
individual’s self must be organized such that, while principally
relying on social relations, it can also resist and therefore free itself
from some of these relations. I propose to use the term distinc-
tion to capture the emancipation as individual from certain social
relations. Without emancipation there could be no identifiable
entity (phenomenologically corresponding to a sense of ipseity,
or of alterity in perceiving the other). Being distinct or emanci-
pated however, does not mean that this individual merely stands
out, independently, against a vast and unchanging sea of social
interactions and relations. In addition to distinction, social need-
ful freedom also entails that the individual continuously becomes
individual through social interaction and relations. I thus suggest
using the term participation to denote the other side of social
needful freedom: the possibility to organizationally rely at differ-
ent moments in the succession of time on different instantiations
of social interactions and relations (see Figure 1)7.
Both kinds of network processes, those enabling distinction
and those that enable participation, are required together to ensure
social needful freedom and to bring about the individual as a net-
work of autonomous self-other organization.Without distinction
the individual would risk becoming heteronomously determined
and forced to rely on the next best or only a limited set of social
interactions. But without participation and its act of openness
toward others, the individual eschews structural renewal, thus
risking isolation and rigidity. This describes what some enactivists
refer to as“precarious conditions”of autonomy (see“The Enactive
Approach to Cognition”). In this case, distinction and partici-
pation both keep the individual from a particular risk, namely
6Such overlap of behavioral and identity constructing processes can already be
seen in non-human animals. Fisher spiders for example store air bubbles trapped
on the surface of their body, thus mechanically stabilizing the bubbles (so called
“plastrons”) to prevent them from collapsing under water. They then use the oxygen
contained in the bubbles to survive for longer periods than they otherwise could,
under the water surface (Flynn and Bush, 2008). Thus the survival of the insect
under water relies not only on constructive processes (of its metabolism) but also
on a particular behavioral and interactive strategy (collecting bubbles, storing them
etc.).
7Note that social relationality need not translate to actual engagement, or actual
interaction, with others. The self in the mode of distinction is not suddenly socially
unrelated, rather it is socially related in two ways: first, in order to be distinguish-
able as individual it relies on particular social relational processes that favor its
distinctiveness, and second, it is related in that the social relational processes that
do not favor or do not matter for its distinctiveness necessarily act as the system’s
environment only against which is visible as unity. Similarly, being in participation
does not mean to cease to exist as separate individual; were this the case, no one
would be distinguishable as participant. For this reason participation is not equal
to participatory sense-making. The latter adopts a more narrow perspective on the
individual, which is determined heteronomously, in terms of its contribution to a
group identity.
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FIGURE 1 | Socially enacted autonomy.The graphic illustrates the basic
organization of the network of processes that constitute the self as
individual socially enacted autonomy. The network processes are social
interactions and relations (the blue-red grid) that are spanned between two
poles, distinction (blue ball, D) and participation (red ball, P). D and P are
interconnected in that they enable each other. Together, the poles
determine and qualify the overall tendencies of the network processes
(indicated by the blue thin arrows left and the red thin arrows on the right)
as having more or less distinction/emancipation and participation/openness.
The network processes are in tension (the double arrow in blue and red).
When social interactions and relations exhibit higher tendencies toward P,
the “pull” from the opposite pole D ensures that the processes do not end
up in a extreme degree of P. In this way the network avoids the risk of
dissolution. Vice versa, when social interaction and relations have a higher
degree of D then the network’s organization tends to balance this with
increasing tendencies toward P, thereby avoiding the risk of isolation.
isolation from others or the dissolution in social interactions, and
they enable each other in doing so.
I propose to capture these ideas in the following definition for
human socially enacted autonomy of the individual:
Individual autonomy is a self-other generated network of precariously
organized interpersonal processes whose systemic identity emerges as a
result of a continuous engagement in social interactions and relations
that can be qualified as moving in two opposed directions, toward
emancipation from others (distinction) and toward openness to them
(participation).
Because of the tension between a risk to dissolve or to
become isolated, the individual, much like the organism, remains
permanently concerned with the continuity of its own existence.
But while mere living systems strive to survive by avoiding interac-
tions with the environment that threaten their biological survival,
the human self qua self-other generation has to avoid tendencies
in social interactions leading to social death.
Just like the organism in its metabolic autonomy, the social
human being follows an intrinsic existential norm guiding behav-
ior and evaluations of interactions. The important difference
is that the organismic identity as a bodily whole is secured by
homeostasis ensuring the body remains stable throughout dif-
ferent interactions with the environment. In the case of the
social self, the stability of the unity is not achieved by indi-
vidual biological or bodily means, but through engaging with
others, by learning first how to and then continuously nego-
tiating the balance between the processes of distinction and
participation. This balance between distinction and participa-
tion is achieved by navigating a range between two extremes,
total distinction and total participation and to thereby co-
regulate, monitor, identify and seek to avoid tendencies of falling
into either of them. This could be the social version of what
some enactivists refer to as adaptive regulation (Figure 2). The
negotiation of distinction and participation can be seen as a
co-enacted, quasi-homeostatic principle keeping the self rela-
tively stable and alive as a socially organized and organizing
existence.
Mere organismic systems adaptively evaluate their interac-
tions with regards to nutrition needed for the maintenance of
metabolism. They seek the right kind and amounts of food, avoid-
ing poisonous food and preferring especially nutritious food.
Humans need an additional kind of nutrition. Because human
autonomy is co-generated with others, it is necessarily vulnerable
to disturbances and conflict. Others can fail or refuse to contribute
to a person’s identity affirmation, which could ultimately inter-
fere with the very organizational network that constitutes human
autonomy. Particular interactions (or the lack thereof) would lead
to problems, either with regards to the individual’s experience as
somebody individual or with her experiences of being somebody
that is connected with others. For them to adaptively regulate their
own states and interactions with the social environment means
to evaluate actions with regard to their contribution to a socially
defined boundary. To this end, processes enabling or limiting recog-
nition of the twofold need for emancipation (distinction) from
and openness to others (participation) can be relevant8. In line
8An important question for further elaboration is how processes of distinction
and participation could be mediated in linguistic terms. To this end, it might be
fruitful to relate the present argument to Maturana’s work on languaging and the
creation of consensual domains in which individuals co-structure their social, not
merely organismic, identities (Maturana, 1978). A further crucial linkage exists
to developmental psychology. Research showing the vital role of intersubjective
engagement in early infant development (e.g., Trevarthen, 1993; Braten, 2004; Stern,
2009) could be relevant for specifying howprocesses of distinction and participation
organize the initial development of socially enacted autonomy. The educational
psychology of Bruner, who was also the first to use the term “enactive,” could
inspire further elaborations of how children continuously expand their self-reflexive
capacities and understanding others through active, intersubjectively structured
learning (Bruner, 1996).
FIGURE 2 | Adaptive regulation of the twofold basic norm of
distinction and participation.The three graphics illustrate different
degrees of distinction (D, blue ball) and participation (P, red ball) in different
contexts. Graphic (A) illustrates an individual featuring a stronger
experience of participation (e.g., when being in love, dancing tango,
emerging in the crowd at a concert). Graphic (B) illustrates an individual
with an equally strong degree of distinction and participation (e.g., in the
intimate encounter or during a fight with a close person). The third graphic
(C) illustrates an individual that experiences a higher degree of distinction
(e.g., during a conference talk, in non-transcendental states of meditation).
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with the present suggestions one could say that social recogni-
tion is vital throughout life (Ikäheimo, 2009). Recognition is the
nutrient required to co-construct the boundary of the self. If
this were not the case, solitary confinement would not be cho-
sen as one of the harshest punishments. As studies with prisoners
have shown, social isolation can lead to serious short-term and
long-term psychiatric disturbances such as paranoia and hallu-
cinations (Grassian, 1983; Haney, 2003; Guenther, 2013) and as
research on social exclusion and ostracism shows human contact
is needed to sustain a minimal social identity and prevent social
death (Bauman, 1992; Williams, 2007).
According to the present proposal social death has two faces. It
could occurwhen the individual gets stuck in the extremes of either
of the two dimensions, distinction or participation. An extreme
degree of distinction would mean that the individual has lost its
connection to the very structures that it is made from (it risks
dying from isolation), while an extreme degree of participation
would mean that the individual has lost its individuality (it risks
dying from dissolution). There are examples that approximate
such extreme degrees in disorders of the self and particularly in
symptomsof schizophrenia (Parnass and Sass, 2010), such as social
or self-isolation (extreme distinction) or loss of agency (extreme
participation).
Recall from section“The Enactive Approach to Cognition” that
the enactive approach also provides a route for integrating a third-
person, organizational perspective with the subjective dimension
and phenomenological perspective of the system itself. Though
it is outside the scope of the present argument, a thorough and
long-term investigation concerning how the processes of distinc-
tion and participation structure subjectivity is as yet required. In
the remainder of this section I provide some examples to indi-
cate how humans ensure their survival as social existence through
interactions and relations that generate or prevent processes of
distinction and participation.
The above definition of socially enacted autonomy proposes
that humans co-generate their identity following a twofold norm.
This can be used to structure the individual’s perspective on the
world in terms of subjective experiences that are evaluated accord-
ing to whether and how they serve survival, i.e., in this case, the
maintenance of the self.
Both distinction and participation are (experienced) types of
social interactions and relations, though they say nothing about
the amount or actuality of engagement. Distinction roughlymeans
that a person experiences herself as emancipated anddistinguished
from certain social interactions and relations. It involves a sense of
separation and of being someone in her own right. This can apply
for a diversity of self-conscious experiences (whether positively,
negatively or otherwise evaluated): doing yoga, nervousness in
front of an audience, feelingdisconnected fromyourpartner, being
proud of an achievement, being the stranger at a party, but also the
joyful experience of finally being alone after having spent the entire
day with other people. Such experiences mirror the basic structure
of social autonomy, as striving to maintain a particular degree of
emancipation as individual. Participation then generally refers to
experiences of feeling both connected and open. It involves a sense
of readiness to affect and to be affected by the other. Again, there
are manifold examples: the sense of self as curious when falling
in love with someone, the pull we feel when finding somebody
sexually attractive, a feelingof letting gowhendancing tango, being
onewith the crowd at a concert and so forth. Such experiences refer
to the basic structure of social autonomy as striving to remain
connected and open to particular types of social interactions and
relations (see Figure 2).
I have given examples, in which either a sense of distinction or
participation ismore prominent. However, these two qualities – of
experiencingoneself as separate fromothers and as somebodywill-
ing to engage – precede or follow each other, and they can even
overlap. There are situations, in which we experience the shift
from one quality to another quite clearly. If, e.g., in a difficult
discussion our partner finally seems to understand what we want
to say, a relief or a sudden relaxation may appear, upon which we
begin to feel less separated from the other and begin to experience
a readiness to be open again. Yet something about this readiness
is already found in feeling separated and misunderstood – one
can at the same time feel the need to just overcome the conflict
and to be in harmony again. Similarly, at a conference presen-
tation we can experience both a sense of separation from the
audience (for instance because of nervousness in the face of crit-
icism) and a sense of eagerness to engage with it (because we
would like to discuss our ideas) at the same time. One of the
clearest examples of the presence of these two basic kinds of expe-
rience is perhaps found in moments of emotional intimacy, or
better, in the struggle therein. In an intimate encounter, expe-
riences of wanting to engage and connect to the partner and
fear of rejection or of losing oneself are situated very close to
each other and individuals can sometimes continuously oscillate
between them. In such moments humans can struggle to find
the fine attunement between a readiness to let go and be open to
other (participation) while, at the same time, an attunement to
owning yourself and remaining visible as another individual (dis-
tinction). Emotional intimacy is mostly rare, perhaps because it
is where the necessarily open and vulnerable self is at its greatest
risk.
In contemplation of human existence, it is our task to remind
and“elucidate those fundamental aspects that are so familiar to us,
so taken for granted, that we often fail to realize their true signifi-
cance and even deny their existence” (Zahavi, 2008, pp. 127–128).
According to the present proposal, what is so familiar to us simply
is human life and how it continuously expresses itself to ourselves
through sequences of experiences of being more or less separated
andof beingmore or less connected.Whatwe struggle to recognize
until we are in a social or personal crisis, in non-transcendental
meditation or adopting a researcher’s and philosopher’s stance,
is that both these experiential dimensions are shades of some-
thing that is fundamental to our nature: we need and we want to
be individuals in our own right, distinguished, able and free but
we thereby also need others and want to be connected, vulnera-
ble, supported and receptive. It is when our standard self-other
perception is challenged that we appreciate that these needs are
probably never achieved independently from others. Being both
emancipated and relational should not be treated independently,
both conditions the self at the same time.
This basic model of socially enacted autonomy could consti-
tute an important conceptual move for an enactive approach to
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the self. It offers an organizational principle for approaching the
self as a co-generated and co-maintained whole. On this view, the
self is not just a lose collection of aspects but has boundaries that
are generated through interacting and being related to others. The
self in its most minimal sense, thus escapes the body. It is never
fully separable from the social environment, but instead deter-
mined precisely in terms of the types of social interactions and
relations of which it is, at the same time, a part. Without an ongo-
ing engagementwith other people, andwithout their contribution,
there is no generation of self.
Yet, that is not to say that the self is essentially social and
“nothing more.” The argument is not in favor of a disembod-
ied conception of the self. To the contrary, as I show in the next
section, in this organization of the self as social existence the body
plays a more than a trivial role.
TOWARD RESOLVING THE BODY-SOCIAL PROBLEM
As a consequence of the above proposal, speaking of the embodied
self cannotmean that the self is the body. Through birth we indeed
become a bodily identity, as we “emancipate” ourselves to some
extent as physiological entities in a material environment. How-
ever, to emancipate as a self, as identity which differs not from
organic bodies but from other human subjects, a further process
of individuation is required (Mahler et al., 2000). This process of
individuation, so I suggest in this paper, is achieved through social
interactions and relations.
This proposal is fully compatible with the idea of an embod-
ied self where the body, rather than being considered the seat
of the self, changes its status and becomes the self ’s means and
mediator.
The body is then non-trivial for the self as a whole to the extent
that it functions as a matrix of co-constructed existence, helping
(together with the brain, of course) to organize human social exis-
tence and to monitor and regulate the intrinsic goal and minimal
purpose of the self: to be someone.
It is an open research question howbodily consciousness relates
to the human (social) self from an enactive point of view. At this
point I can only hint at it. For the enactive approach the cre-
ation of a living and cognitive identity brings about a perspective,
which is considered as a minimal form of consciousness. This
chimes well above mentioned research on the bodily basis of self-
consciousness. The idea is to then extend these ideas to the social
domain. If, as I suggest, the self is not a bodily but socially co-
enacted identity, and if consciousness arises with the creation of
identity, then an essential part of (bodily) self-consciousness may
emerge through relations with others. Bodily self-consciousness,
embodied emotions and existential feelings can then be seen as
ways of informing an individual about its state of being in a world
of others.
Conjoining the embodied turn with the social in a more than
pluralistic sense, the idea of the self as socially enacted continues
to do justice to the embodied turn in cognitive science, which
recognizes the non-neuronal body, but risks reducing it to a
developmental role. It could also pick up where extended func-
tionalist approaches to embodiment remain inflationary (Kyselo
and Di Paolo, 2013). Acknowledging that (cognitive) identity is
irreducible to the physiology of one’s own body while at the same
time considering the body a matrix of an enacted social existence,
provides the body with a more clearly defined status. It is not a
rock or remote island, but it is also not a random vessel. On the
present account, being someone implies being an individual that
one can connect to and that remains open to being affected by oth-
ers. The body plays a major role in making this possible. It is an
interface for connection. But the structure of that body interface
to the world is not rigid. It is fluctuating, a subject to perma-
nent change – change that mostly happens in reaction to and in
dependence on our relations with other beings. In continuation of
Bernstein’s theory of motor psychology, according to which bod-
ily movement shapes the brain’s motor system instead of bodily
movement being controlled by the brain (Thelen, 2004), within
the logic of the argument at hand, there might be a further rever-
sal regarding the relation between body and sociality. The body is
not merely a means but also an imprint of social engagement. As a
consequence, bodily consciousness alone would be insufficient to
ground even the most minimal sense of the human self. Instead, it
might be seen as a kind a sensor formonitoring social engagements
and relations with the goal of social homeostasis. This sensor does
not merely reside within the realms of the individual’s body and
actions, it is also co-constituted in and through the space created
between individuals.
Of course, there is something quite crucial to insisting that
a person feels their very self changes when they change bodily
aspects of their existence, be it when they become sick, suffer
an accident leading to disability or even when they only change
slightly, say with getting a new hair cut or dress. But we can admit
this without also arguing that body and self are ontologically the
same. The point I want to make is that many bodily changes mat-
ters for someone because of what they mean with respect to this
person’s relation to the social world and how she fares in its rela-
tion to others. Bodily experiences acquire a social meaning and I
propose that this meaning is generally evaluated according to the
twofold norm of distinction and participation. The new hair is
not merely a change to some biomaterial that grows out of my
head. It is a change to the way I look, and thus relate to myself
and to others, and of course to the way, in which others relate
to me. My partner might notice the difference in style and com-
pliment that I look fresher, more beautiful etc. But if after my
haircut I went to work for medicins sans frontiers, the change of
style would probably not matter much. The point is what I feel
about my haircut depends on how I saw and now see myself and
on how others have seen and now see me. It requires an implicit
act of relationality to make this bodily change significant for my
self.
Let me now come back to the two empirical examples, intro-
duced in section “The Body-Social Problem in Cognitive Science”
where this point becomes more pressing: the possibility of posi-
tive quality of life in LIS and social pain. Recall first the case of LIS
patients, who despite being globally paralyzed, report a positive
quality of life. One way of making sense of this is by adopting
what I would call a cognitive adaptation strategy. In a recent study,
Nizzi et al. (2012) conducted interviews with LIS patients to assess
how the paralysis affected their sense of personal identity. They
found that patients can adjust very well to the objective change
in physiology and actually “feel the same as before the accident.”
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According to the authors, this is because the patients maintained
a positive subjective “bodily representation” (p. 435). If positive
quality of life has to do with a positive self representation then
this adjustment strategy can explain why patients feel well despite
the paralysis. However, Nizzi et al.’s (2012) interpretation seems
to presuppose a disembodied view of the self. Whether or not
the body is subject to severe objective change plays no role for
the patient’s self as long as she consciously decides that it does
not. One of the problems for an explanation of well-being in
LIS is that it risks trivializing the role of the non-neuronal body
for the self – all the necessary work could be done by a bodily
representation, presumably located in the brain. For an (essen-
tially) embodied approach to the self this interpretation must
seem counter-intuitive. The embodied self implies that there is
a relation between objective physiological change and subjective
experiences of self and well-being. On adopting this view, one
would probably have to assume that LIS, being a global bodily
paralysis, is in a sense also a disorder of the self and of (bodily)
self consciousness. If the self is equated with the body and the
bodily self considered as grounding first-person subjectivity, then
the patients’ well-being should be affected. And yet, as the results
of Nizzi et al.’s (2012) interviews and other qualitative studies on
LIS patients seem to suggest, this is not the case. The embod-
ied approach to the self (as a whole) would thus actually make a
counterfactual prediction.
The proposed model of the self as socially organized autonomy
could provide an alternative to the cognitive adaptation story. On
the enactive interpretation, the self remains non-trivially embod-
ied in the sense that it is mediated by the body; the body is part of
the interface organizing the individual’s social existence. Accord-
ing to this perspective, the patient can adapt to the new situation
precisely because she is not the physiological body, but a genuinely
social self. The physiological change matters because it changes
the ways, in which the patient is able to relate to others and,
in which others relate to her. To the extent that these relations
are still given, even the most minimal form of communication –
as can be seen in the usage of brain computer interfaces – can
suffice to enact the processes necessary for the individuation of
self (distinction and participation) and thus for integrating bod-
ily changes into a positive sense of self. This interpretation is also
empirically supported by studies of less severe forms of disability.
Babies with Moebius syndrome, for example, lack facial expres-
sions and are unable to show their care-givers “that someone is
home” (Cole, 2009, p. 351). This can affect how care-givers react
to their children. They might respond to them with “reduced sig-
nals”which can in turn cause “emotional impoverishment” (Cole,
2009, p. 354). For patients with spinal cord injury “disablement
[ha]s nothing to do with the body. It is a consequence of social
oppression” (Cole, 2009, p. 348). Paralysis is “not simply a physical
affair ... but an ontology, a condition of our being in the world”
(Murphy, 1990, p. 90). Despite global restrictions, the LIS patient
is still “yearning for intersubjectivity” (Dudzinski, 2001, p. 43).
Statements such as these suggest that it is through being related
to others that bodily changes can affect and be integrated in our
self. The fact that the “quality of life often equates with social
rather than physical interaction” (Gosseries et al., 2009, p. 199)
makes sense when the boundaries of the self are not determined
by bodily processes alone, but rather in terms of relational and
co-enacted processes. LIS can be considered a disorder of the self
to the extent that the body is restricted as the individual means of
social relationality, not as the seat or constitutive basis of the self.
More accurately, like other cases of disability, LIS should be seen
as a “disease of social relations” (Murphy, 1990, p. 4). This also
means, for better or worse, whether she is able to integrate severe
bodily changes and lead a happy life, does not entirely depend
on the patient herself, but also on the support and recognition of
others.
An interpretation of well-being in LIS makes sense from a
disembodied view, but the idea of the self as mediated by the
body offers a non-reductive explanation, doing justice to both, the
embodied and the social turn in cognitive science.
The present proposal also makes sense in light of the fact that
social rejection hurts (see “The Body-Social Problem in Cognitive
Science”). One might be tempted to read this fact prima facie as
evidence for the primacy of the organic body in individuating the
self as a whole and so as supporting the idea of the (essentially)
embodied self. This is indeed what Eisenberger seems to have in
mind when arguing that the pain is evolutionary beneficial since
it helps to ensure survival. On such a reading, the social matters,
contextually in allowing an individual to survive as a biological
identity (a minimal bodily self, if you will). The social rejection
of being excluded from participating in a game hurts because it
indicates a risk, namely that others will not be there to help protect
the biological self 9.
The alternativewouldbe to consider the evidence that themajor
source of concern for human existence does not stem from nui-
sances within the organic body itself, but rather from the fact that
human existence is organized socially. Thus, instead of reducing
sociality to the role of the means to a biological end, why not
take the evidence as direct support for the fact that humans are
concerned about their existence as social beings? I would agree
with Eisenberger that the pain of social rejection is beneficial for
survival. But in light of the present consideration, this survival
is not merely biological. Rather, the empirical example can be
seen as support for the hypothesized relation between socially
enacted autonomy and the fundamental role of social recogni-
tion as enabling the processes of distinction and participation.
Social rejection constitutes a potential violation of recognizingme
as someone others can connect to or who can connect to others,
but it also risks reducing my ability to be seen as a distinct indi-
vidual. On assuming that the body mediates a socially enacted
self, pain of social rejection could be one of the body’s clever
ways of cautioning the self against the lack of recognition and
its ultimate consequence, social death. I would thus reverse the
9One might wonder whether and to what extent this can be extrapolated to human
identity in general. It could invite an odd argument according towhichhumansmust
suffer physiological pain for every social activity in which they are not included. This
is obviously not the case. Whether a certain interaction counts as a case of social
rejection might be better determined by evaluating whether it means something to
the person, and this depends onhow she is related orwants to be related to the people
involved in the interaction. If a person does not care to be included in the activity,
then she would not feel rejected and therefore also not experience physiological
pain. Even if the person desires to be included, if she reassures herself that that the
exclusion is temporary, she avoid interpreting the situation as a rejection and thus
remain pain-free.
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standard argument: the social does not help the bodily self as a
whole, instead the body is helping the self to survive as a social
whole.
To conclude these considerations on the quality of life and
pain of social rejection, there is no logical reason that forces us to
prefer one of the three possibilities of interrelating body, self and
sociality (disembodied, essentially embodied or bodily mediated).
The first example supports both a disembodied and a socially
enacted view of the self, while the second example seems to be
plausible onboth an essentially embodied andon a socially enacted
and bodily mediated account of the self. I am thus not arguing
that my approach is the only game in town. What I would like
to suggest however is that it might be preferable for the purpose
of cross-disciplinary dialog, since it rises to the challenge of the
body-social problem without avoiding either, the embodied or
social turn in cognitive science. At the same time it might have
advantages over a pattern approach to the self, since it does not
merely account for diversity but also provides an account of the
self as a coherent unity and determines howother dimensions such
as sociality and (neural andmore than neural) embodimentmight
integrate as aspects of this unity.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have introduced the body-social problem, the
question for cognitive science of how bodily and social aspects
go together in an account of the human self as a whole. I have
discussed the problem in more detail with regards to research on
social cognition in enactivism, where it translates to the question
of how bodily individual autonomy and higher, socially enacted
forms of autonomy, are interrelated.
I proposed the principle of individuation through and from a
world to extend Jonas’ notion of needful freedom and to ground
an integrative perspective on the embodied and social self. Accord-
ing to this principle, humans emancipate themselves not merely
through organic, but also interpersonal, interactions. Their iden-
tity emerges out of a tension concerning social freedom: humans
strive to distinguish themselves from others as individuals, yet
at the same time they also strive for connection with, and being
affected by, others.
I elaborated on the enactive approach to individual autonomy
and indicated how this discussion can inform an approach to
human identity as co-generated and organized in terms of an
adaptive regulation of social distinction and participation pro-
cesses. I have argued that the enactive approach to the self can be a
way for cognitive science to avoid the dilemma of the body-social
problem. One does not have to choose between positing an iso-
lated bodily individual or an individual as mere participant. The
positive contributions entailed in both horns of the body-social
dilemma are brought together in an integrative way. In this view,
humans are participating and therefore able to emancipate them-
selves, and because they emancipate themselves they are able to
participate. The self is constitutively social, not merely develop-
mentally, but throughout its life. The body’s role is to mediate that
social existence and is the major key to ensuring the twofold goal
of maintaining both distinction and participation, leaving the pos-
sibility open for non-physiological forms of self-co-maintenance,
using tools and language-based technology.
The paper provides an alternative to a pattern approach to
the self. It acknowledges diversity but as shown in the context of
empirical examples, such as the positive quality of life in patients
with global paralysis and the pain of social rejection, it also offers
some ideas for how they integrate.
These considerations are not meant as a final word on the
question of how self, body and sociality interrelate. The paper
provides some novel and basic conceptual suggestions for cogni-
tive science to integrate embodiment and sociality in a way that
neither underestimates the role of interpersonal relations, nor
runs the risk of losing the individual through an overemphasis
on group and interaction dynamics. I propose them as stepping-
stones toward a biologically based, yet social and experientially
plausible approach to human individuation. Further investiga-
tions, to this end, are required, including philosophical inquiries
on self and intersubjectivity at the intersection of philosophy of
mind and phenomenology as well as philosophical anthropology.
Further required are explorations of existing linkages to inter-
subjective approaches to self and subjectivity in other fields of
cognitive science, especially developmental psychology, psychiatry,
and social neuroscience.
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